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Abstract. We consider the cheating strategies for the popular match-
ings problem. Let G = (A∪P , E) be a bipartite graph where A denotes
a set of agents, P denotes a set of posts and the edges in E are ranked.
Each agent ranks a subset of posts in an order of preference, possibly
involving ties. A matching M is popular if there exists no matching M ′
such that the number of agents that prefer M ′ to M exceeds the num-
ber of agents that prefer M to M ′. Consider a centralized market where
agents submit their preferences and a central authority matches agents
to posts according to the notion of popularity. Since a popular matching
need not be unique, we assume that the central authority chooses an
arbitrary popular matching. Let a1 be the sole manipulative agent who
is aware of the true preference lists of all other agents. The goal of a1 is
to falsify her preference list to get better always, that is, in the falsified
instance (i) every popular matching matches a1 to a post that is at least
as good as the most-preferred post that she gets when she was truth-
ful, and (ii) some popular matching matches a1 to a post better than the
most-preferred post p that she gets when she was truthful, assuming that
p is not one of a1’s (true) most-preferred posts. We show that the optimal
cheating strategy for a single agent to get better always can be computed
in O(m+n) time when preference lists are all strict and in O(
√
nm) time
when preference lists are allowed to contain ties. Here n = |A|+ |P| and
m = |E|. Next, we consider the set of agents, their preference lists and
the popular matchings algorithm as a non-cooperative game. We show
a necessary and sufficient condition for the true preference lists of the
agents to be an equilibrium of this game when each agent wishes to get
better always.
To compute the cheating strategies, we develop a switching graph charac-
terization of the popular matchings problem involving ties. The switching
graph characterization was studied for the case of strict lists by McDer-
mid and Irving (J. Comb. Optim. 2011) and was open for the case of
ties. We show an O(
√
nm) algorithm to compute the set of popular pairs
using the switching graph. These results are of independent interest and
answer a part of the open questions posed by McDermid and Irving.
1 Introduction
We consider the cheating strategies for the popular matchings problem. Let
G = (A∪P , E) be a bipartite graph where A denotes a set of agents, P denotes
⋆ This work was supported in part by NSF grant CCF-0830737.
a set of posts, and the edges in E are ranked. Each agent ranks a subset of posts
in an order of preference, possibly involving ties. This ranking of posts by an
agent is called the preference list of the agent. An agent a prefers post pi to post
pj if the rank of post pi is smaller than the rank of post pj in a’s preference list.
An agent a is indifferent between posts pi and pj if they have the same rank on
a’s preference list. When agents can be indifferent between posts, the preference
lists are said to contain ties, otherwise the preference lists are strict. A matching
M of G is a subset of edges, no two of which share an end point. For a matched
vertex u, let M(u) denote its partner in the matching M . An agent a prefers a
matching M to another matching M ′ if (i) a is matched in M but unmatched
in M ′, or (ii) a prefers M(a) to M ′(a).
Definition 1. A matching M is more popular than M ′ if the number of agents
that prefer M is greater than the number of agents that prefer M ′. A matching
M is popular if there is no matching M ′ that is more popular than M .
There exist simple instances that do not admit any popular matching – how-
ever, when an instance admits a popular matching, there may be more than one
popular matching. Abraham et al. [1] characterized the instances that admit
popular matchings and gave efficient algorithms to compute a popular matching
if one exists.
Our problem. Consider a centralized matching market where each agent a ∈ A
submits a preference over a subset of posts and a central authority matches
agents to posts using the criteria of popularity. Let a1 be the sole manipulative
agent who is aware of the true preference lists of all other agents and the pref-
erence lists of a ∈ A \ {a1} remain fixed throughout. The goal of a1 is clear:
she wishes to falsify her preference list so as to improve the post that she gets
matched to as compared to the post she got when she was truthful. Since there
may be more than one popular matching in an instance, we assume that the
central authority chooses an arbitrary popular matching. Let G = (A ∪ P , E)
denote the instance where ranks on the edges represent true preferences of all
the agents. Let H denote the instance obtained by falsifying the preference list
of a1 alone. We assume that G admits a popular matching and a1 falsifies in
order to create an instance H which also admits a popular matching. Note that
it may be possible for a1 to falsify her preference list such that H does not admit
any popular matching. But we do not consider such a falsification.
Agent a1 wishes to falsify her preference list to ensure that (i) every popular
matching in H matches her to a post that is at least as good as the most-
preferred post that she gets matched to in G, and (ii) some popular matching
in H matches a1 to a post better than the most-preferred post p that she gets
matched to in G, assuming that p is not a1’s true first choice post. We term this
strategy of a1 as ‘better always’ strategy.
1.1 Our contributions
– Let a1 be the sole manipulative agent who wishes to get better always. The
optimal strategy for a1 can be computed in O(m+ n) time when preference
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lists are all strict and in O(
√
nm) time when preference lists are allowed to
contain ties.
– Next, consider the set of agents, their preference lists and the popular match-
ings algorithm as a non-cooperative game. We show a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the true preference lists to be an equilibrium of the game
assuming that every agent wishes to get better always.
– To compute the cheating strategies, we develop a switching graph characteri-
zation of the popular matchings problem involving ties. The switching graph
characterization was studied for the case of strict lists by McDermid and Irv-
ing [13] and such a characterization was not known for the case of ties. Using
the switching graph, we show an O(
√
nm) time algorithm to compute the set
of popular pairs. An edge (a, p) ∈ E is a popular pair if there exists a popu-
lar matching M in G such that (a, p) ∈M . We also show that counting the
total number of popular matchings in an instance with ties is #P-Complete.
The switching graph characterization is of independent interest and answers
a part of the open questions in [13].
1.2 Related work
The work in this paper is motivated by the work of Teo et al. [16] where they
study the strategic issues of the stable marriage problem [3]. The stable marriage
problem is a generalization of our problem where both the sides of the bipartition
(usually referred to as men and women) rank members of the opposite side in
order of their preference. Teo et al. [16] study the strategic issues of the stable
marriage problem where women are required to give complete preference lists and
there is a sole manipulative woman. Further, she is aware of the true preference
lists of all the other women. Teo et al. [16] compute an optimal cheating strategy
for a single woman under this model. Huang [5] studies the strategic issues of
the stable room-mates problem [3] under a similar model. In the same spirit, we
study the strategic issues of the popular matchings problem.
The notion of popular matchings was introduced by Ga¨rdenfors [4] in the
context of the stable marriage [3]. Abraham et al. [1] studied the problem for
one-sided preference lists and gave a characterization of instances which admit
a popular matching. Subsequent to this result, the popular matchings problem
has received a lot of attention [11] [12] [9] [6] [8]. However, to the best of our
knowledge none of them is motivated by the strategic issues of the popular
matchings problem.
2 Background
We first review the following well known properties of maximum matchings in
bipartite graphs. Let G = (A ∪ P , E) be a bipartite graph and let M be a
maximum matching in G. The matching M defines a partition of the vertex
set A ∪ P into three disjoint sets: a vertex v ∈ A ∪ P is even (resp. odd) if
there is an even (resp. odd) length alternating path in G w.r.t. M from an
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unmatched vertex to v. A vertex v is unreachable if there is no alternating path
from an unmatched vertex to v. Denote by E , O and U the sets of even, odd,
and unreachable vertices, respectively, in G. The following lemma is well known
in matching theory; its proof can be found in [15] or [7].
Lemma 1 ([15] Dulmage Mendelsohn). Let E, O and U be the sets of ver-
tices defined by a maximum matching M in G. Then,
(a) E, O and U are pairwise disjoint, and independent of the maximum matching
M in G.
(b) In any maximum matching of G, every vertex in O is matched with a vertex
in E, and every vertex in U is matched with another vertex in U . The size
of a maximum matching is |O|+ |U|/2.
(c) No maximum matching of G contains an edge between a vertex in O and a
vertex in O∪U . Also, G contains no edge between a vertex in E and a vertex
in E ∪ U .
We now review the characterization of the popular matchings problem from
[1]. As was done in [1], we create a unique last-resort post ℓ(a) for each agent a.
In this way, we can assume that every agent is matched, since any unmatched
agent a can be paired with ℓ(a). For an agent a, let f(a) be the set of rank-1
posts for a. To define s(a), let us consider the graph G1 = (A∪P , E1) on rank-1
edges in G and let M1 be any maximum matching in G1. Let O1, E1,U1 define
the partition of vertices A ∪ P with respect to M1 in G1. For any agent a, let
s(a) denote the set of most preferred posts which belong to E1 by the above
partition. Abraham et al. [1] proved the following theorem.
Theorem 1 ([1]). A matching M is popular in G iff
(1) M ∩E1 is a maximum matching of G1 = (A ∪P , E1), and
(2) for each agent a, M(a) ∈ {f(a) ∪ s(a)}.
The algorithm for solving the popular matching problem is as follows: each a ∈ A
determines the sets f(a) and s(a). An A-complete matching (a matching that
matches all agents) that is maximum in G1 and that matches each a to a post in
{f(a)∪s(a)} needs to be determined. If no such matching exists, then G does not
admit a popular matching. Abraham et al. [1] gave an O(
√
nm) time algorithm
to compute a popular matching in G which is presented as Algorithm 2.1. Steps
7–11 are added by us and will be used to define the switching graph in the next
section. Abraham et al. [1] also showed a simpler characterization for the popular
matchings in case of strict lists which results in an O(m+ n) time algorithm to
return a popular matching if one exists.
Let G′ = (A ∪ P , E′) denote the graph in which every agent a has edges
incident to {f(a) ∪ s(a)}. Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1 deletes edges from G′ which
cannot be present in any maximum matching of G1. We extend this further and
in Step 9 delete edges from G′ which cannot be present in any popular matching
in G. For this, let us partition the vertex set A∪P as O2, E2 and U2 with respect
to a popular matching M in G′. Since any popular matching M is a maximum
matching in G′, it is easy to see that M cannot contain edges of the form O2O2
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and O2U2 (by Lemma 1(c)). However, note that since M matches every agent,
it implies that A ∩ E2 = ∅ and P ∩ O2 = ∅. Thus, there are no O2O2 edges in
the graph G′. Therefore, any edge (a, p) deleted in Step 9 is of the form a ∈ O2
and p ∈ U2. We can now make the following claim.
Claim. Let a be an agent such that a ∈ U2. Then, in Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1,
no edge incident on a gets deleted. Let a be an agent such that a ∈ E1. Then, in
Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1, no edge incident on a gets deleted.
Algorithm 2.1 O(
√
nm)-time algorithm for the popular matching problem [1]
(Steps 1–6).
Input: G = (A∪ P , E).
1: Construct the graph G′ = (A ∪ P , E′), where E′ = {(a, p) : a ∈ A and p ∈
f(a) ∪ s(a)}.
2: Construct the graph G1 = (A ∪ P , E1) and let M1 be any maximum matching in
G1.
3: Partition A ∪ P as O1, E1,U1 with respect to M1 in G1.
4: Remove any edge in G′ between a node in O1 and a node in O1 ∪ U1.
5: Determine a maximum matching M in G′ by augmenting M1.
6: Return M if it is A-complete, otherwise return “no popular matching”.
7: if G admits a popular matching then
8: Partition A ∪ P as O2, E2,U2 with respect to M in G′.
9: Remove any edge in G′ between a node in O2 and a node in U2.
10: Denote the resulting graph as G′′ = (A∪ P , E′′).
11: end if
Definition 2. For an agent a, let choices(a) be the set of posts p such that (a, p)
is an edge in G′′.
It is easy to see that for any a ∈ A, choices(a) ⊆ {f(a) ∪ s(a)}. Further, if
M is a popular matching in G, then M(a) ∈ choices(a).
3 The switching graph characterization
In this section we develop the switching graph for the popular matchings problem
with ties. In case of strict lists, McDermid and Irving [13] defined a switching
graph GM = (P , EM ) as a directed graph on the posts of G and the edge set
EM was determined by a popular matching M in G. In fact, a similar graph
was defined even before that by Mahdian [11] (again for strict lists) to study
existence of popular matchings in random instances. We use the notation and
terminology from [13].
Let G be an instance of the popular matchings problem with ties and let M
be a popular matching in G. The switching graph GM = (P , EM ) is a directed
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weighted graph on the posts P of G and is defined with respect to a popular
matching M in G. The edge set EM is defined using the pruned graph G
′′ =
(A∪P , E′′) constructed in Step 10 of Algorithm 2.1. There exists an edge from
pi to pj (with pi 6= pj) iff for some a ∈ A, pi = M(a) and (a, pj) ∈ E′′. The
weight of an edge w(M(a), pj) is defined as:
w(M(a), pj) = 0 if a is indifferent between M(a) and pj
= −1 if a prefers M(a) to pj
= +1 if a prefers pj to M(a).
It is easy to see that the graph GM = (P , EM ) can be constructed in O(
√
nm)
time using Algorithm 2.1.
Consider a vertex p in GM . Call p a sink vertex in GM if out-degree of p is
zero in GM . The following lemma characterizes sinks in GM .
Lemma 2. A post p is a sink vertex in GM if and only if p is unmatched in M .
Let X be a maximal weakly connected component of GM . Call X a sink com-
ponent if X contains one or more sink vertices otherwise call X a non-sink
component.
For a path T (resp. cycle C) in GM , the weight of the path w(T ) (resp. w(C))
is the sum of the weights on the edges in T (resp. C). (Whenever we refer to paths
and cycles in GM we imply directed paths and directed cycles respectively.) A
path T = 〈p1, . . . , pk〉 in GM is called a switching path if T ends in a sink vertex
and w(T ) = 0. Similarly, a cycle C = 〈p1, . . . , pk, p1〉 in GM is called a switching
cycle if w(C) = 0. Let AT = {ai : M(pi) = ai, for i = 1 . . . k } and denote by
M ′ = M ·T the matching obtained by applying the switching path to M , that is,
for ai ∈ AT , M ′(ai) = pi+1 whereas for a /∈ AT , M ′(a) =M(a). Similarly, for a
switching cycle C, define AC = {ai : M(pi) = ai, for i = 1 . . . k } and denote by
M ′ = M · C the matching obtained by applying the switching cycle to M , that
is, for ai ∈ AC , M ′(ai) = pi+1 mod k whereas for a /∈ AC , M ′(a) = M(a).
Example 1.
Consider an instance G where A = {a1, . . . , a7} and P = {p1, . . . , p9}. The
preference lists of the agents are shown in Figure 1(a). The preference lists can
be read as follows: agent a1 ranks posts p1, p2, p3 as her rank-1, rank-2 and rank-
3 posts respectively and the two posts p6 and p7 are tied as her rank-4 posts.
For every agent a, the posts which are bold denote the set f(a), whereas the
posts which are underlined denote the set s(a). The instance G admits a popular
matching; M and M ′ shown below are both popular in G.
M = {(a1, p6), (a2, p1), (a3, p8), (a4, p2), (a5, p3), (a6, p9), (a7, p4)} (1)
M ′ = {(a1, p6), (a2, p1), (a3, p8), (a4, p2), (a5, p4), (a6, p3), (a7, p5)} (2)
Figure 1(b) shows the switching graph GM with respect to the popular matching
M . We note that the edges (a4, p3) and (a1, p1) get deleted in Step 4 and Step 9
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of Algorithm 2.1, respectively. Hence the switching graph GM does not have
the edges (M(a4) = p2, p3) and (M(a1) = p6, p1) respectively. Consider the
switching path T = 〈p9, p3, p4, p5〉 in GM . By applying T toM we getM ′ =M ·T
(see Equation (2)) which is also popular in G.
a1 : p1 p2 p3 (p6, p7)
a2 : p1 p2 p8
a3 : p1 p8
a4 : (p2,p3) p1 p8
a5 : p3 (p2, p4)
a6 : p3 p9 p1
a7 : (p4,p5) p1
(a)
PSfrag replacements
p1
p2
p3 p4
p5
p6 p7
p8
p9
−1
−1
−1
+1
+1
0
0
(b)
Fig. 1. (a) Preference lists of agents {a1, . . . , a7}. The posts which are bold denote
f(a) and the posts which are underlined denote s(a). (b) Switching graph GM with
respect to the popular matching M in G.
3.1 Some useful properties
In this section we prove some useful properties of the switching graph GM .
Recall that the vertices A ∪ P are partitioned as O1, E1,U1 w.r.t. a maximum
matching M1 in G1 (see Step 3 of Algorithm 2.1). Further, the vertices A ∪ P
are partitioned as O2, E2,U2 w.r.t. a popular matching M in G′ (see Step 8 of
Algorithm 2.1).
Property 1. All sink vertices of GM belong to the set E1.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that p is a sink vertex in GM and
p ∈ O1 ∪ U1. Recall that the sink vertices of GM are unmatched posts in the
popular matching M in G. Since M is a popular matching, it implies that M is
a maximum matching on rank-1 edges in G. However, every maximum matching
on rank-1 edges of G matches every vertex in O1 ∪ U1. Thus, if p is unmatched
in M and p ∈ O1 ∪U1, it implies that M is not a maximum matching on rank-1
edges of G, a contradiction.
Property 2. Every post p belonging to a sink component has a path to a sink
and hence belongs to the set E2. Every post belonging to a non-sink component
belongs to the set U2.
Proof. We prove that a post p belongs to a sink component of GM iff p ∈ E2.
Let p be a post such that p ∈ E2. Then p is either unmatched in M or p has
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an even length alternating path starting at an unmatched vertex p′ with respect
to M in G′. If p is unmatched, then p is a sink vertex in GM and hence we
are done. Else let 〈p = p1, a1, . . . , pk, ak, pk+1 = p′〉 denote the alternating path
and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we have M(pi) = ai. Note that every unmatched
edge (ai, pi+1) is of the form O2E2 and hence none of these unmatched edges
get deleted in Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1. Therefore, it is easy to see that the path
〈p = p1, p2, . . . , pk+1 = p′〉 is present in GM and hence p belongs to the sink
component that contains p′.
To prove the other direction let X be a sink component in GM and let p be
some vertex in X . If p ∈ E2, it is easy to see that p has a path to some sink vertex
in X and we are done, else p ∈ U2. Recall that O2∩P = ∅. Since p belongs to X ,
there exists some vertex p′ in X such that p′ ∈ E2 and p′ has a path to p in GM .
Let 〈p′ = p1, p2, . . . , pk = p〉 denote a path of minimal length. Note that for each
1 ≤ i ≤ k, pi is matched in M and let M(pi) = ai. By the minimality of the
path, we know that for 2 ≤ i ≤ k, pi ∈ U2. However, p1 ∈ E2 implies a1 ∈ O2.
Thus the presence of edge (p1, p2) in GM implies that there is a O2U2 edge in
the graph G′′ which should have been deleted by step 9 of Algorithm 2.1. Hence
such an edge cannot be present in GM contradicting the fact that p ∈ U2. This
implies that every vertex contained in a sink component of GM has a path to
some sink in the component.
The above proof immediately implies that a post p belongs to a non-sink
component iff p ∈ U2. This finishes the proof of Property 2.
Property 3. For an edge (pi, pj) in GM , the weight w(pi, pj) is determined by
which partition pi and pj belong to when vertices are partitioned as O1, E1,U1.
w(pi, pj) can be determined using Table 1.
❅
❅pi
pj O1 E1 U1
O1 0 −1 ×
E1 +1 0 ×
U1 × −1 0
Table 1. Table shows w(pi, pj) for an edge (pi, pj) in GM . The weight is determined by
the partition of vertices as O1, E1,U1. The × denotes that such an edge is not present
in GM .
Proof. To prove Property 3 we justify the entries in Table 1. Let (pi, pj) be an
edge in GM and let M(pi) = a. The weight on the edge (pi, pj) is determined
by the relative ranks of pi and pj in a’s preference list. We note that a post
p ∈ O1 ∪ U1 has only rank-1 edges incident on it in the graph G′. Hence if
pi ∈ O1 ∪ U1, then a treats pi as her rank-1 post.
– pi ∈ O1: a treats pi as her rank-1 post and since posts in O1 remain matched
along agents in E1, it implies that a ∈ E1.
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• pj ∈ O1: a treats pj as her rank-1 post, thus, w(pi, pj) = 0.
• pj ∈ E1: We show that a treats pj as her non-rank-1 post and hence
w(pi, pj) = −1. Assume for the sake of contradiction that a treats pj as
a rank-1 post. It implies that there is a E1E1 edge in the graph G1, a
contradiction (by part (c) Lemma 1).
• pj ∈ U1: We show that such an edge cannot exist in GM . Recall that
posts in U1 have only rank-1 edges incident on them, hence a treats
pj as her rank-1 post. This implies that there is a E1U1 edge in G1 a
contradiction (by part (c) of Lemma 1).
– pi ∈ E1: Here we consider two cases:
(i) a treats pi as her rank-1 post: In this case, we note that s(a) ⊆ f(a) and
hence a has only rank-1 edges incident on it in the graph G′ and all these
edges are incident on posts which belong to E1. Thus the only case possible
is, pj ∈ E1 and w(pi, pj) = 0.
(ii) a treats pi as her non-rank-1 post: We first note that a ∈ E1 because
agents in O1∪U1 remain matched along rank-1 edges in every popular match-
ing. Consider the three different cases for pj .
• pj ∈ O1: a treats pj as her rank-1 post and hence w(pi, pj) = +1.
• pj ∈ E1: We show that a treats pj as her non-rank-1 post and hence
w(pi, pj) = 0. Assume for the sake of contradiction that a treats pj as
her rank-1 post. Then there exists an E1E1 edge in G1 a contradiction
(by part (c) of Lemma 1).
• pj ∈ U1: We show that such an edge cannot exist in GM . If such an
edge exists there is an E1U1 edge in G1 a contradiction (by part (c) of
Lemma 1).
– pi ∈ U1: a treats pi as her rank-1 post and since posts in U1 remain matched
along agents in U1, it implies that a ∈ U1.
• pj ∈ O1: a treats pj as her rank-1 post however such an edge gets deleted
as an O1U1 edge in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1. Thus such an edge cannot
be present in GM .
• pj ∈ E1: We show that a treats pj as her non-rank-1 edge and hence
w(pi, pj) = −1. Assume for the sake of contradiction that a treats pj as
a rank-1 post then, it implies that there is a U1E1 edge in the graph G1,
a contradiction (by part (c) of Lemma 1).
• pj ∈ U1: a treats pj as her rank-1 post and therefore w(pi, pj) = 0.
Property 4. Every path T in GM has w(T ) ∈ {−1, 0,+1}. Every cycle C in
GM has w(C) = 0. There exists no path T in GM ending in a sink vertex with
w(T ) = +1.
Proof. It is easy to observe that if the edges have weights according to Table 1,
then every path in GM has weight belonging to {−1, 0,+1}. Further every cycle
has to have weight 0. It remains to argue that in GM there exists no path T
of weight +1 which ends in a sink. For contradiction, assume that such a path
exists in GM and consider applying the path T to M to obtain the matching
M ′ = M · T . The number of agents that prefer M ′ to M is exactly one more
than the number of agents that prefer M to M ′. Thus M ′ is more popular than
M , contradicting the fact that M was a popular matching.
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Property 5. For any switching path T (or switching cycle C) in GM , the match-
ing M ′ = M · T (M ′ =M · C resp.) is a popular matching in G. Every popular
matching M ′ in G can be obtained from M by applying to M one or more
vertex disjoint switching paths and switching cycles in each of a subset of sink
components of GM together with one or more vertex disjoint switching cycles in
each of a subset of the non-sink components of GM .
Proof. Let T = 〈p1, p2, . . . , pk〉 be a switching path in GM with pk unmatched
in M and M ′ = M · T denote the matching obtained by applying the path
T to M . Let AT = ∪k−1i=1 {M(pi) = ai}. We observe that for every ai ∈ AT ,
M ′(ai) ∈ {f(ai) ∪ s(ai)} because edges of GM are derived from a subset of
graph G′ = (A ∪ P , E′) (refer to Algorithm 2.1). Further for any a /∈ AT ,
M ′(a) = M(a). Finally note that since w(T ) = 0, for every agent that got
demoted from her rank-1 post there exists a unique agent who got promoted to
her rank-1 post in M ′. Thus, M ′ is a maximum matching on rank-1 edges of G.
It is therefore clear that M ′ satisfies both the properties defined by Theorem 1
and hence M ′ is a popular matching in G. An exactly similar argument proves
that for any switching cycle C, M · C is also a popular matching in G.
LetM ′ be any popular matching in G. ConsiderM⊕M ′, this is set of vertex
disjoint even length paths and even length cycles inG. Let TG = 〈p1, a1, . . . , pk, ak, pk+1〉
be any even length path inM⊕M ′ with pk+1 unmatched inM and p1 unmatched
in M ′. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let M(pi) = ai. Note that every unmatched edge
(ai, pi+1) is of the form O2E2 and hence none of these unmatched edges get
deleted in Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1. Therefore, it is easy to see that the path
〈p = p1, p2, . . . , pk+1 = p′〉 is present in GM and it ends in a sink. Note that
w(T ) cannot be strictly positive since M is a popular matching. Similarly, w(T )
cannot be strictly negative. This is because since both M and M ′ are popular,
w(T ) ≤ −1 implies that there exists another path T ′G (or a cycle C′G) inM⊕M ′,
whose corresponding path T ′ (resp. cycle C′) in the graph GM has a positive
weight. However, this again contradicts the fact that M is a popular matching.
Thus, the path T has weight 0 and ends in a sink and hence is a switching
path. A similar argument shows that every cycle in M ⊕M ′ has a corresponding
switching cycle in GM . Applying these switching paths and cycles to M gives us
the desired matching M ′, thus completing the proof.
Recall the definition of choices(a) for an agent as given by Definition 2. We
now define the notion of a tight-pair , that is, a set of agents A1 and a set of
posts P1 with |A1| = |P1|. Further, for every a ∈ A1 we have choices(a) ⊆ P1.
We show that a tight-pair exists whenever there is a non-sink component in the
switching graph GM .
Lemma 3. Let Y be a non-sink component in GM and q ∈ Y. Let,
Pq = q ∪ {p : q has a path to p in GM }
Then there exists a set of agents Aq such that (i) |Aq| = |Pq|, and (ii) for every
a ∈ Aq, choices(a) ⊆ Pq.
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Proof. Let Aq = ∪p∈PqM(p). Since every p ∈ Pq is matched, we note that
|Aq| = |Pq|. Consider any agent a ∈ Aq; then M(a) ∈ Pq and note that M(a) ∈
choices(a). Further, note that, for every p′ ∈ choices(a) \ {M(a)}, we have an
edge (M(a), p′) in GM . Thus, every such p
′ also belongs to Pq. This proves that
for every a ∈ Aq, choices(a) ⊆ Pq.
3.2 Generating popular pairs and counting popular matchings
Let G = (A ∪ P , E) be an instance of the popular matchings problem. Define
PopPairs = {(a, p) ∈ E : M is a popular matching in G and M(a) = p}. (3)
Using the switching graph defined in the previous section, it is easy to compute
the set PopPairs in G. Let GM be the switching graph with respect to a popular
matching M in G. From Property 5 we can conclude that an edge e = (a, p) is a
popular pair if and only if (i) e ∈M or, (ii) the edge (M(a), p) belongs to some
switching path in GM or, (iii) the edge (M(a), p) belongs to some switching cycle
in GM .
We note that edges satisfying condition (i) can be marked in O(
√
nm) time
using Algorithm 2.1 and edges satisfying conditions (ii) and (iii) can be marked
in linear time in the size of the switching graph. Thus, we conclude the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. The set of popular pairs for an instance G = (A ∪ P , E) of the
popular matchings problem with ties can be computed in O(
√
nm) time.
Proof. From Property 5 we can conclude that an edge e = (a, p) is a popular
pair if and only if (i) e ∈M or, (ii) the edge (M(a), p) belongs to some switching
path in GM or, (iii) the edge (M(a), p) belongs to some switching cycle in GM .
We show how each of these conditions can be efficiently verified.
– The condition (i) can be checked in O(
√
nm) time by running Algorithm 2.1
and obtaining a popular matching M .
– In order to check condition (iii), recall that every cycle in GM has weight
0 and is therefore a switching cycle. Hence this condition can be checked
in linear time in the size of the switching graph by identifying strongly
connected components of GM . Every edge belonging to a strongly connected
component is a popular pair.
– In order to check condition (ii), recall that a switching path is a path which
has weight 0 and ends in a sink. Therefore such paths can be found only in
sink components of GM or equivalently paths beginning at vertices in E2.
Further, any sink vertex in GM has to be a vertex in E1 according to the
partition on rank-1 edges of G. Using the weights on the edges given by
Table 1, it is easy to see that any 0 weight path ending in a sink has to begin
at a vertex p ∈ E1. Thus, a simple depth-first search beginning at vertices in
E1 ∩ E2 and marking all edges that we encounter as popular pairs takes care
of condition (ii). It is easy to see that this procedure also takes time linear
in the size of GM .
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We now show that given an instance of the popular matchings problem with
ties, the problem of counting the number of popular matchings is #P-Complete.
Theorem 3. Given an instance G = (A∪P , E) of the popular matchings prob-
lem with ties, counting the total number of popular matchings in G is #P-
Complete.
Proof. In order to prove the completeness result, we reduce from the problem
of counting the number of perfect matchings in 3-regular bipartite graphs. This
problem was shown to be #P-Complete by Dagum and Luby [2]. Let H =
(A ∪ P , E) be a 3-regular bipartite graph. We construct an instance G = H of
the popular matching problem by assigning all the edges in E as rank-1 edges.
It is well-known that a k-regular bipartite graph admits a perfect matching and
hence it is easy to see that every perfect matching in H is a popular matching
in G and vice versa. Thus, the theorem statement follows.
4 Cheating strategies – preliminaries
In this section we set up the notation useful in formulating our cheating strate-
gies. We begin by partitioning the set of agents A depending on the posts that
a particular agent gets matched to when each agent is truthful, that is, in the
instance G.
Af = {a : every popular matching in G matches a to one of her rank-1 posts}
As = {a : every popular matching in G matches a to one of her non-rank-1 posts}
Af/s = A \ ( Af ∪ As ).
The set Af/s denotes the set of agents a such that a gets matched to one of
her rank-1 posts in some popular matching in G, whereas to one of her non-
rank-1 posts in some other popular matching in G. It is easy to see that the
above partition can be readily obtained once we have the set of popular pairs
PopPairs (defined by Equation (3)).
Let a1 be the sole manipulative agent who is aware of the true preference
lists of all other agents. Let L = P1, P2, . . . , Pt, . . . , Pl denote the true preference
list of a1 where Pi denotes the set of i-th rank posts of a1. Since we will be
working with another instance H obtained by falsifying the preference list of
a1, we now qualify the sets f(a) and s(a) for every agent with the instance
under consideration. For an agent a, let fG(a) and sG(a) denote sets f(a) and
s(a) respectively for agent a in G. We note that fG(a1) = P1. Assume that
sG(a1) ⊆ Pt is the set of t-th ranked posts of a1, where t > 1.
Recall the strategy – better always defined for a single manipulative agent. If
agent a1 ∈ Af , then she does not have any incentive to manipulate her preference
list. Thus, in this case we are done and L is her optimal strategy. We therefore
focus on a1 ∈ As ∪ Af/s. Let H denote the instance obtained by falsifying the
preference list of a1 alone.
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– If a1 ∈ As, then in order to get better always her goal is to force at least some
popular matching in H to match her to a post which she strictly prefers to
her t-th ranked post (that is, sG(a1)).
– If a1 ∈ Af/s, then in order to get better always her goal is to force every
popular matching in H to match her to one of her true rank-1 posts.
Denote by H ≻ G with respect to a1 if agent a1 is better always in H .
It is instructive to consider examples to get intuition regarding the cheating
strategies.
Example 2.
Consider the instance G as shown in Figure 1 and let a5 be the manipulative
agent. It can be seen that a5 ∈ Af/s in G. Now consider the instance H where
a5 alone falsifies her preference list such that p3 is her rank-1 post and p8 as her
rank-2 post.
a5 : p3 p8
It is easy to verify that every popular matching in H matches a5 to p3 which is
her true rank-1 post. The idea for an Af/s agent a is to choose a post in sH(a)
(here p8) to which a can never be matched in a popular matching in H . We will
show that such a post can be chosen whenever there exists a non-sink component
in the switching graph and therefore a tight-pair (in this case P1 = {p8, p1} and
A1 = {a2, a3}).
Example 3.
Consider the instance G shown in Figure 1 and let a1 be the manipulative agent.
Every popular matching in Gmatches a1 to either p6 or p7 and therefore a1 ∈ As.
Let H denote the instance where a1 submits the preference list as follows: p3 is
her rank-1 post whereas p8 is her rank-2 post.
a1 : p3 p8
It can be verified that every popular matching in H matches a1 to p3. The
intuition here is that, a post to which a1 wishes to get matched (here p3), should
have a path to an unmatched post or roughly belong to a sink component of
GM . We also choose a post in sH(a1) (in this case p8) to which a1 can never get
matched in any popular matching in H . However, in this example, this is not
the best that a1 can get by falsifying. Let a1 falsify her preference list as below
and let H denote the falsified instance.
a1 : p2 p8
Consider the matchingM ′′ = {(a1, p2), (a2, p1), (a3, p8), (a4, p3), (a5, p4), (a6, p9), (a7, p5)}
in H . It can be verified thatM ′′ is popular in H and in fact every popular match-
ing in H matches a1 to p2. However, our intuition that p2 should belong to a sink
component does not hold. This is because the edge (a4, p3) which got deleted
in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1 is being used after a1 falsifies her preference list. In
order to deal with such cases we will work with a slightly modified instance as
defined in Section 4.3.
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4.1 s(a) for other agents remains unchanged
Let H denote the instance obtained by falsifying the preference list of a1 alone.
Since the rest of the agents are truthful, for every agent a ∈ A \ {a1}, we
have fH(a) = fG(a). However, since sH(a) depends on the rank-1 posts of the
rest of the agents, it may be the case that when a1 falsifies her preference list,
sH(a) 6= sG(a) for an agent a ∈ A \ {a1}. We claim that if a1 falsifies her
preference list only to improve the rank of the post that she gets matched to,
the rest of the agents do not change their s(a). Recall that by definition, sH(a)
is the set of most preferred posts of a which are even in the graph H1 (the graph
H on rank-1 edges). Theorem 4 states the claim; its proof requires the following
lemmas.
Lemma 4. Let a1 ∈ As ∪ Af/s when she is truthful. Then, fG(a1) ⊆ (O1)G.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, let q ∈ fG(a1) such that, q ∈ (E1∪U1)G. This implies
that a1 ∈ (O1∪U1)G. Note that any agent in (O1∪U1)G remains matched along
her rank-1 edge in every popular matching of G. This is because if a1 ∈ (O1)G,
then sG(a1) ⊆ fG(a1) and therefore a1 has no non-rank-1 edges incident on it
in the graph G′. On the other hand, if a1 ∈ (U1)G and if a1 gets matched to a
non-rank-1 post in a popular matching M , then M is not a maximum matching
on rank-1 edges of G. Therefore in each case, a1 remains matched along a rank-1
edge in every popular matching in G contradicting the fact that a1 ∈ As ∪Af/s.
Thus, fG(a1) ⊆ (O1)G.
Lemma 5. Let H be such that H ≻ G w.r.t. a1. Then fH(a1) ⊆ (O1 ∪ U1)G.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists an instance H ≻ G w.r.t a1
and let fH(a1) ∩ (E1)G = {q1, . . . , qk}. Note that the rank of each qi in a1’s
preference list is at least t. We show that every popular matching in H matches
a1 to one of qi and hence the rank of the most preferred post that a1 gets in H
is at least t, a contradiction to H ≻ G w.r.t. a1.
We first show that if fH(a1) ∩ (E1)G 6= φ, then the size of the maximum
matching on rank-1 edges of H is strictly larger than the size of the maximum
matching on rank-1 edges of G. Let G1 be the graph on rank-1 edges of G and
let M1 be a maximum matching in G1 that leaves a1 unmatched. Note that
such a matching exists because fG(a1) ⊆ (O1)G which implies that a1 ∈ (E1)G.
Consider the graph H1, that is, the graph on rank-1 edges of H . Note that
M1 is a matching in H1 as no other agent changes her preference list. Since
each qi ∈ (E1)G and a1 ∈ (E1)G, the addition of the edge (a1, qi) creates an
augmenting path with respect to M1 in the graph H1. Thus, we get another
matching, say M2, in H1 such that |M2| = |M1 + 1|.
Now consider a popular matching M ′ in H and let M ′1 denote the matching
M ′ restricted to rank-1 edges of H . Since M ′ has to be a maximum matching
on rank-1 edges of H , it is clear that |M ′1| = |M2|. Further since M ′(a1) ∈
{fH(a1) ∪ sH(a1)} let us consider the following cases:
– M ′(a1) ∈ {q1, . . . , qk}: In this case we have the desired contradiction and we
are done.
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– M ′(a1) = q where q ∈ fH(a1) ∩ (O1 ∪ U1)G: If q ∈ fG(a1), then the edge
(a1, q) ∈ G1 and therefore M ′1 is in fact a matching in G1. Now since |M ′1| =
|M1| + 1, it contradicts the fact that M1 was a maximum matching in G1.
Therefore assume that, q /∈ fG(a1). Note that M ′2 = M ′1 \ {(a1, q)} is in fact
a maximum matching of G1 since no other agents changed their preferences.
However, M ′2 leaves q unmatched which contradicts the fact that q ∈ (O1 ∪
U1)G, since every vertex in (O1 ∪ U1)G remains matched in any maximum
matching of G1.
– M ′(a1) ∈ sH(a1): If sH(a1) ⊆ fH(a1), the previous cases have already han-
dled this. In the other case assume that sH(a1) ∩ fH(a1) = φ. This implies
that M ′1 leaves a1 unmatched. Thus, M
′
1 is also a matching in G1 since no
other agents changed their preferences. However, |M ′1| = |M1| + 1 which
contradicts the fact that M1 was a maximum matching in G1.
This finishes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 6. Let M1 be a maximum matching in G1 such that M1 leaves a1 un-
matched. Then, in any instance H such that H ≻ G w.r.t. a1, M1 is a maximum
matching in H1.
Proof. We first note that such a maximum matching M1 in G1 which leaves
a1 unmatched exists, because fG(a1) ⊆ (O1)G, hence a1 ∈ (E1)G. Assume that
M1 is not a maximum matching in H1. Then there exists an augmenting path
〈a1, p1, . . . , ak, pk〉 in H1 with respect to M1 where both a1 and pk are un-
matched. However, using the path 〈pk, ak, . . . , p1〉, we have an even length alter-
nating path from pk to p1 contradicting the fact that p1 ∈ (O1 ∪U1)G. Thus M1
is a maximum matching in H1.
Theorem 4. Let H be an instance such that H ≻ G w.r.t. a1. Then, (i) (E1)G∩
P = (E1)H ∩ P and therefore sH(a) = sG(a) for every a ∈ A \ {a1} and, (ii)
(O1)G ∩ A = (O1)H ∩ A.
Proof. The proof uses Lemma 4, Lemma 5, and Lemma 6 proved above. The
case when fH(a1) = fG(a1) is easy, since H1 = G1 and both (i) and (ii) are
trivially true. Consider the case when fH(a1) 6= fG(a1) and let M1 be a maxi-
mum matching in G1 such that M1 leaves a1 unmatched. By Lemma 6, M1 is
also a maximum matching in H1. To prove (E1)G ∩P = (E1)H ∩P , consider the
following two cases:
– p ∈ (O1 ∪ U1)G ∩ P : Assume for contradiction that p ∈ (E1)H ∩ P . This
implies that there exists an even length alternating path T with respect to
M1 in H1 from an unmatched post in H1. The path T can not contain a1,
since a1 is unmatched in M1, thus T is present in G1 contradicting the fact
that p ∈ (O1 ∪ U1)G ∩ P .
– p ∈ (E1)G ∩ P : Let T denote the even length alternating path w.r.t. M1 in
G1 starting at an unmatched post in M1. The path T again can not contain
a1 and hence exists in H1 thus proving that p ∈ (E1)H ∩ P .
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Now, since the preference lists of the agents a ∈ A \ {a1} remain unchanged, it
is clear that sH(a) = sG(a).
Finally, consider any a ∈ (O1)G ∩ A. For contradiction, assume that a ∈
(E1)H ∩ A. Then a has an even length alternating path T w.r.t. M1 in H1
starting at an unmatched agent. This path has to begin at a1, otherwise, it was
already present in G1. However, the existence of the path T beginning at a1
implies that there exists a post q ∈ fH(a1) such that q ∈ (E1)G. This contradicts
Lemma 5 and thus finishes the proof of the lemma.
4.2 An As agent cannot get one of her true rank-1 posts
In this section we show that if a1 ∈ As, then by falsifying her preference list alone,
she cannot get matched to one of her true rank-1 posts in any popular matching
in H . We prove it using Theorem 5 which requires the following lemmas.
Lemma 7. Let a1 ∈ As, and let q ∈ fG(a1). Then, q belongs to a non-sink
component of GM and the edge (M(a1), q) is not contained in a cycle in GM .
Proof. We first show that the edge (M(a1), q) is not contained in a cycle in GM .
Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists a cycle C in GM which
contains the edge (M(a1), q). Since every cycle in GM has a weight 0, the cycle
C is a switching cycle and hence we get another popular matching M ′ =M · C
in which a1 gets matched to q. Since q ∈ fG(a1), this contradicts the fact that
a1 ∈ As.
We now show that every q ∈ fG(a1) belongs to a non-sink component of GM .
Assume not. Then, let there exist some q ∈ fG(a1) such that q belongs to a sink
component, say X of GM . In this case we show that there exists a switching path
T beginning at M(a1) which uses the edge (M(a1), q). Using T , we construct
another popular matching M ′ = M · T where a1 gets matched to q. Thus, we
get the desired contradiction as a1 ∈ As.
It remains to prove that the switching path T exists. Observe that the since
q belongs to a sink component X , by Property 2 there exists a path T1 from q
to some sink q′ in X . By Property 1, it is clear that q′ ∈ E1 and from Lemma 4,
we know that q ∈ O1. Using Table 1 of edge weights, it is clear that the path
T1 starting a vertex in O1 and ending in a vertex in E1 has weight w(T1) = −1.
Finally note that, w(M(a1), q) = +1 since M(a1) ∈ sG(a1) and q ∈ fG(a1).
Thus, we obtain the switching path T = 〈M(a1), q, T1〉 which ends in the sink
q′ and has w(T ) = 0. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 8. Let a1 ∈ As and let q ∈ fG(a1). Let Pq be defined as
Pq = q ∪ {q′ : there is a path from q to q′ in GM}
Let Aq = ∪q′∈PqM(q′). Then, a1 /∈ Aq.
Proof. Note that since a1 ∈ As and q ∈ fG(a1), by Lemma 7, q belongs to a non-
sink component, say Y, of GM . If M(a1) does not belong to Y, then it is clear
that M(a1) /∈ Pq. Otherwise, let M(a1) belong to Y. In this case, we show that
16
if there exists a path from q to M(a1) in Y, then along with the edge (M(a1), q)
there is a cycle in GM containing the edge (M(a1), q) which is a contradiction
by Lemma 7. Thus, we need to show that the edge (M(a1), q) does not get
deleted in either Step 4 or Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1. Since M(a1) belongs to a
non-sink component, therefore M(a1) ∈ (U2)G which implies that a1 ∈ (U2)G.
Further, since q ∈ fG(a1), by Lemma 4, we know that q ∈ (O1)G. This implies
that a1 ∈ (E1)G. Thus, from Claim 2, it is clear that no edge incident on a1 gets
deleted in either Step 9 or Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1. Thus, a1 /∈ Aq.
Lemma 9. Let a1 ∈ As and let q ∈ fG(a1). Then, there exists sets Aq and Pq
such that |Aq| = |Pq| and for every a ∈ Aq we have choicesH(a) ∈ Pq.
Proof. Since a1 ∈ As and q ∈ fG(a1), from Lemma 7, we know that q belongs to
a non-sink component, say Y, of GM . Therefore, using Lemma 3, we know that
there exists a tight-pair Aq and Pq such that |Aq| = |Pq| and for each a ∈ Aq, we
have choicesG(a) ⊆ Pq. Further, Lemma 4 implies that q ∈ (O1)G. Now consider
any post q′ ∈ Pq. From the Table 1, it is easy to see that q′ ∈ (O1 ∪ E1)G, since
posts in (U1)G cannot be reached starting at a post in (O1)G. Therefore, we note
that every a ∈ Aq is such that a ∈ (E1 ∪ O1)G. This is because in any popular
matching, posts in (O1 ∪ E1) remain matched to agents in (O1 ∪ E1). To prove
the lemma it suffices to show that for every a ∈ Aq, choicesH(a) ⊆ choicesG(a).
By Lemma 8, a1 /∈ Aq and therefore, we know that {fG(a) ∪ sG(a)} =
{fH(a) ∪ sH(a)}, for all a ∈ Aq. If no edges had got deleted in Step 4 and
Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1 then we would be done since choicesG(a) would have
been {fG(a) ∪ sG(a)}. Observe that since every a ∈ Aq belongs to a non-sink
component of GM , therefore a ∈ (U2)G, thus, by Claim 2 no edge incident on a
gets deleted in Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1 when run on G.
It remains to show that if a′ ∈ Aq and edge (a′, q′) gets deleted in Step 4
of Algorithm 2.1 when run on G, then (a′, q′) also gets deleted in Step 4 of
Algorithm 2.1 when run on H . If a′ ∈ (E1)G, by Claim 2 no edge incident on a′
gets deleted in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1 when run on G. Finally, let a′ ∈ (O1)G. If
the edge (a′, q′) got deleted in Step 4, then q′ ∈ (O1 ∪U1)G. Thus, by Lemma 4,
a′ ∈ (O1)H and q′ ∈ (O1∪U1)H , thus the edge (a′, q′) continues to get deleted in
Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1 when run on H . This completes the proof of the lemma.
Using the above lemmas we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let a1 ∈ As. Then by falsifying her preference list alone, she can-
not get matched to a post q ∈ fG(a1) in any popular matching in the falsified
instance.
Proof. For contradiction assume that there exists a falsified instance H such
that in a popular matching M ′ of H , agent a1 gets matched to q ∈ fG(a1).
By Lemma 7, the post q belongs to a non-sink component of GM . Further by
Lemma 9, there exists a set of agents Aq and a set of posts Pq such that |Aq| =
|Pq|, a1 /∈ Aq and for every a ∈ Aq, we have choicesH(a) ⊆ Pq. Thus, if a1 gets
matched to q in M ′, then there is at least one agent a′ ∈ Aq which does not
have a post to be matched in choicesH(a
′). This contradicts the fact that M ′ is
a popular matching in H .
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4.3 The modified instance G˜
As mentioned earlier, we need to define a modified instance, call it G˜ to develop
our cheating strategies. Recall from Example 3 that a rank-1 edge which gets
deleted from the graph G′ in Algorithm 2.1, can be used in a popular matching
in a falsified instance. Thus, we define G˜ from the instance G which has the
following properties: (i) every popular matching in G is a popular matching in
G˜ and, (ii) any edge (a, p) that gets deleted in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1 when
run on G˜ also gets deleted in Step 4 when Algorithm 2.1 is run on H such that
H ≻ G w.r.t. a1. However, the definition of G˜ is independent of the agent a1.
The graph G˜ is defined as follows: Let G1 be the graph on rank-1 edges of
G and let {q1, . . . , qk} be the set of unreachable posts in G1. Let us add to the
instance G, a dummy agent b whose preference list is of length 1 and has all the
unreachable posts in G1 tied as her rank-1 posts. That is, the preference list of
b can be written as (q1, . . . , qk). The set of posts as well as the preference lists
of all the agents a ∈ A remain the same as in G. Formally, G˜ = (A˜ ∪ P , E˜)
where A˜ = A∪ {b} and E˜ = E ∪ {(b, q1), . . . , (b, qk)} and each (b, qi) is a rank-1
edge. By the choice of preference list of b, we note that fG˜(b) = {q1, . . . , qk} and
sG˜(b) = ℓ(b), the unique last-resort post that we add for convenience.
We note that even after the addition of agent b, a maximum matching M1
in G1 continues to be maximum matching in G˜1. However, with respect to the
partition of vertices on rank-1 edges in G˜, every vertex is either odd or even in
G˜1. We show that addition of b leaves the set s(a) unchanged for every agent
a ∈ A.
Lemma 10. For every a ∈ A, we have sG˜(a) = sG(a).
Proof. It suffices to show that (E1)G˜ ∩ P = (E1)G ∩ P . Let M1 be a maximum
matching in G1. Since M1 is also a maximum matching in G˜1, partition the
vertices of A˜ ∪ P w.r.t. M1 in G˜1. It is easy to see that the addition of agent b
only makes every post that was unreachable in G1 as odd in G˜1. Thus the set of
even posts in G1 and G˜1 is same which completes the proof.
Now letM be a popular matching in G, then let M˜ denote the corresponding
matching in G˜ such that for every a ∈ A we have M˜(a) = M(a) and M˜(b) = ℓ(b),
the unique last-resort post of b. Note that M˜ is a maximum matching on rank-
1 edges in G˜ and for every a ∈ A, we have M˜(a) ∈ {fG˜(a) ∪ sG˜(a)}. Finally
M˜(b) ∈ sG˜(b) since sG˜(b) = {ℓ(b)}. It is clear that M˜ satisfied both the properties
of Theorem 1 and therefore is a popular matching in G˜. We can now construct
the switching graph G˜M˜ w.r.t. M˜ in G˜. Having made these definitions, we can
now prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 11. Let (a, p) be an edge which gets deleted in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1
run on G˜. Then (a, p) gets deleted in Step 4 when Algorithm 2.1 is run on any
instance H such that H ≻ G w.r.t. a1.
Proof. As mentioned earlier all vertices in G˜1 are either odd or even, hence
if an edge (a, p) got deleted in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1, then it implies that
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{a, p} ∈ (O1)G˜. To prove the lemma statement, it suffices to show that an agent
or a post that was odd in G˜1 does not become even in H1. Recall that a maximum
matching M1 in G1 which leaves a1 unmatched is also a maximum matching in
G˜1 as well as in H1. Let a ∈ A be such that a ∈ (O1)G˜. This implies that there
exists an odd length alternating path T1 in G˜1 beginning at an unmatched post
p. The path T1 cannot contain a1 since a1 is unmatched inM1. For contradiction,
assume that a ∈ (E1)H . Then there exists an even length alternating path T2 in
H1 starting at an unmatched agent. This path has to begin at a1, otherwise it
was already present in G˜1 contradicting the fact that a ∈ (O1)G˜. However, if the
path begins at a1, since a1 in unmatched in M1, we get an augmenting path by
joining T1 and T2 which contradicts the maximality of M1 in H1.
Now consider p ∈ P such that p ∈ (O1)G˜ and let T1 denote the odd length
alternating path starting at an unmatched agent. The path T1 has to begin at
a1, if not, the same path is present in H1 and hence we are done. Now assume for
the sake of contradiction that p ∈ (E1)H . Let T2 be the even length alternating
path with respect to M1 in H1 from an unmatched post p
′. The path T2 cannot
contain a1 since a1 is unmatched and hence joining the two paths T1 and T2 we
get an augmenting path in G˜1 contradicting the maximality of M1 in G˜1.
Lemma 12. Let a ∈ A \ {a1} such that M˜(a) belongs to a non-sink component
of G˜M˜ . Let H be an instance such that H ≻ G w.r.t. a1. Then choicesH(a) ⊆
choicesG˜(a).
Proof. Recall that for any a ∈ A \ {a1}, fG˜(a) = fG(a) = fH(a) and sG˜(a) =
sG(a) = sH(a). We also know that, in any instance, for an agent a, choices(a) ⊆
{f(a)∪s(a)}. Thus, if for an agent a ∈ A\{a1}, it were the case that choicesG˜(a) =
{fG˜(a)∪ sG˜(a)}, then the lemma statement holds trivially. However due to dele-
tion of edges in Step 4 and Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1 when run on G˜, it may be
the case that choicesG˜(a) ⊂ {fG˜(a) ∪ sG˜(a)}. We note that since M(a) belongs
to a non-sink component it implies that both {a,M(a)} ∈ (U2)G˜. Therefore, by
Claim 2, no edge incident on a gets deleted in Step 9. Further by Lemma 11,
it is clear that if an edge (a, p) gets deleted in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1 run in
G˜, then the same edge gets deleted in Step 4 when run on H . This gives us the
desired result that choicesH(a) ⊆ choicesG˜(a) and completes the proof of the
lemma.
5 Single manipulative agent
In this section we develop an efficient characterization of the conditions under
which a1 can falsify her preference list. We formulate the strategy of a1 depend-
ing on whether a1 ∈ As or a1 ∈ Af/s. Throughout, we assume that the true
preference list of a1 is denoted by L = P1, . . . , Pt, . . . , Pl where Pi denotes the
set of i-th ranked posts of a1. Further, fG(a1) = P1 and sG(a1) ⊆ Pt. We will
use the modified instance G˜ to formulate our strategies.
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5.1 As agent
Let a1 ∈ As and let M be any popular matching in G and M˜ denote the
corresponding popular matching in G˜ which matches b to ℓ(b). It follows from
the definition of As that, M(a1) = M˜(a1) ∈ sG(a1) and therefore M(a1) ∈ Pt.
We first characterize whether a1 can get better always using the graph G˜ and
the switching graph G˜M˜ .
Our cheating strategy for a1 (as shown in Figure 2) is simple: it checks if any
of a1’s i-th ranked posts p ∈ Pi where i = 2 . . . t − 1, either belongs to a sink
component in G˜M˜ or has a path to M˜(a1) in G˜M˜ . If there exists such a post
p, our strategy ensures that every popular matching in the falsified instance H
matches a1 to p. We denote by Lf the falsified preference list of a1. We now
state the main theorem in this section.
1. For i = 2 . . . t− 1 check if there exists a post p ∈ Pi in a1’s preference list such
that
(a) p belongs to a sink component in G˜M˜ or,
(b) p has a path to M˜(a1) in G˜M˜ .
2. If no post satisfies (a) or (b) above, then true preference list L is optimal for
a1.
3. Else let p denote the most preferred post of a1 satisfying one of the above two
properties. Set post p as a1’s rank-1 post in the falsified preference list.
4. To obtain the rank-2 post for a1, let a2 be some agent such that M˜(a2) ∈
fG(a1). Let p
′ ∈ sG(a2). Set p′ as the rank-2 post of a1 in the falsified instance.
5. Lf = p, p′.
Fig. 2. Cheating strategy for a1 ∈ As.
Theorem 6. Let a ∈ As. Then there exists a cheating strategy for a1 to get bet-
ter always if and only if there exists a post p ranked 2 . . . t− 1 on a1’s preference
list satisfying either
(a) p belongs to a sink component in G˜M˜ or,
(b) p has a path to M˜(a1) in G˜M˜ .
Proof. We break down the proof into necessity and sufficiency.
Necessity: Assume that a post p satisfying one of the two properties of The-
orem 6 exists. Let Lf = p, p′ be the falsified preference list for a1 as returned by
Step 5 of Figure 2. Let H denote the instance where a1 submits Lf and the rest
of the agents are truthful. We begin by noting that sH(a1) = p
′. This is because
p′ ∈ sG(a2) and hence p′ ∈ (E1)G, therefore p′ ∈ (E1)H . We show the following
hold:
– There exists a popular matching M ′ in H such that M ′(a1) = p : Let
M1 = M˜ \{(a1, M˜(a1)), (b, M˜(b))}, thus the post M˜(a1) is unmatched inM1.
If p had a path to M˜(a1), then let T denote a path from p to M˜(a1) in the
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graph G˜M˜ . Else if p belongs to a sink component X of G˜M˜ , then let T denote
a path from p to a sink in X . We note that the path T does not contain M˜(b)
since M˜(b) = ℓ(b) which does not have any incoming edge. In either case,
apply the path T to M1 to get another matching M2, that is, M2 =M1 · T .
Finally M ′ = M2 ∪ (a1, p). Since p is a post ranked 2, . . . , t − 1 in a1 true
preference list, and the rank of posts in sG(a1) is exactly t, it implies that
p ∈ (O1 ∪U1)G. Therefore we can conclude that that p ∈ (O1)G˜. Further, in
either case when the path T ends in a sink vertex or it ends in M˜(a1), the
end point of the path is a post which belongs to (E1)G˜. Thus the path T has
weight w(T ) = −1 (refer Table 1).
We prove that M ′ is popular H . Note that for every a ∈ A \ {a1}, we have
M ′(a) ∈ {fG˜(a)∪sG˜(a)} which implies that M ′(a) ∈ {fH(a)∪sH(a)}. Also,
M ′(a1) = p and note that fH(a1) = {p}. Finally, it remains to show that
M ′ is a maximum matching on rank-1 edges of H . To see this, note that,
w(T ) = −1, therefore the number of rank-1 edges in M2 is exactly one less
than the number of rank-1 edges in M˜ . However, since a1 gets matched to
her rank-1 post in M ′, the number of rank-1 edges in M˜ and M ′ are exactly
the same, thus proving that M ′ is in fact a maximum matching in H1. Thus,
M ′ is popular in H .
– Every popular matching in H matches a1 to p : For the purpose of
proving this part we will work with the graph G and the switching graph
GM corresponding to a popular matching M in G. For contradiction assume
that there exists a popular matching M ′′ in H such that M ′′(a1) = p
′.
Note that the rank-2 post p′ of a1 is chosen as follows. Let a2 be an agent
such that M˜(a2) ∈ fG(a1). Then p′ ∈ sG(a2). Recall that M˜ is a popular
matching in G˜ which is obtained from a popular matching M in G. Let
M(a2) = M˜(a2) = q. Note that since q ∈ fG(a1), by Lemma 7, q belongs
to a non-sink component in GM . Further, by Lemma 9, there exists a set
Aq and Pq such that |Aq| = |Pq|, a1 /∈ Aq and for every a ∈ Aq, we have
choicesH(a) ⊆ Aq. We show that the post p′ also belongs to Pq and therefore
if M ′′(a1) matches a1 to p
′ then there exists at least one agent a ∈ Aq who
does not have a post to be matched in choicesH(a). Thus, M
′′ cannot be
a popular matching in H . It remains to prove that p′ ∈ Pq. Note that
q = M(a2) ∈ fG(a2) and p′ ∈ sG(a2). If GM contains the edge (q, p′), then
we are done since by definition of Pq, it is clear that p′ ∈ Pq. The edge
(q, p′) can be absent in GM only if the edge (a2, p
′) gets deleted in Step 9
of Algorithm 2.1. Note that (a2, p
′) cannot get deleted in Step 4 since only
rank-1 edges get deleted in Step 4. Since q belongs to a non-sink component
in GM , it implies that q ∈ (U2)G. Therefore M(q) = a2 also belongs to
(U2)G. Thus by Claim 2, the edge (a2, p′) does not get deleted in Step 9 of
Algorithm 2.1 and hence p′ ∈ Pq. This completes the proof.
Sufficiency: To prove that our strategy in Figure 2 is optimal, we note that
when a1 was truthful, she got matched to her t-th ranked post in every popular
matching in G. Using our strategy either she gets matched to her k-th ranked
post in every popular matching in H where k < t or we declare that true
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preference list is optimal in which case she remains matched to her t-th ranked
post where k = t. Then there exists no instance H such that a popular matching
in H matches a1 to a post q
′ which a1 strictly prefers to her k-th ranked post.
For contradiction assume that there exists such an instance H obtained by
falsifying the preference list of a1 alone. Let M
′ be some popular matching of H
such that M ′(a1) = q and a1 strictly prefers q to her k-th ranked post. Since our
strategy in Figure 2 did not find q, the post q belongs to a non-sink component
Y in G˜M˜ and further there exists no path from q to M˜(a1) in G˜M˜ . Now consider
the two sets Pq and Aq as defined by Lemma 3. We know that |Aq| = |Pq|.
Further, for every a ∈ Aq, we have {choicesG˜(a)} ⊆ Pq. Note that, a1 /∈ Aq′ ,
otherwise M˜(a1) ∈ Pq′ which implies that there exists a path from q to M˜(a1),
a contradiction. Further, note that ℓ(b) /∈ Pq and therefore, b /∈ Aq. Thus, for
every a ∈ Aq we have {choicesH(a)} ⊆ Pq′ . Therefore, if M ′ matches a1 to q′,
there exists at least one agent a ∈ Aq′ who does not have a post to be matched
in choicesH(a) and hence M
′ is not a popular matching in H .
This finishes the proof of the theorem.
5.2 Af/s agent
Let a1 ∈ Af/s when she submits her true preference list. In order to get better
always, the goal of a1 is to falsify her preference list such that every popular
matching in the falsified instance H matches a1 to posts in P1.
LetM be a popular matching in G such that M(a1) = p and p ∈ fG(a1). Let
M˜ denote the corresponding popular matching in G˜ which matches b to ℓ(b).
Consider the switching graph G˜M˜ . Our strategy for a1 to get better always (as
described in Figure 3) is to search for an even post p′ in G1 which belongs to
a non-sink component of G˜M˜ and further the post p
′ does not have a path T
to M˜(a1) in G˜M˜ where w(T ) = +1. We prove the correctness and optimality of
our strategy using the following theorem.
1. For every p′ ∈ (E1)G ∩ P check if
(a) p′ belongs to a non-sink component, say Y1, of G˜M˜ and,
(b) p′ does not have a path T to M˜(a1) in G˜M˜ such that w(T ) = +1.
2. If no post satisfies both properties, declare true preference list L is optimal for
a1.
3. Else set M(a1) = p and p
′ as the rank-1 and rank-2 posts respectively in the
falsified preference list of a1.
4. Lf = p, p′.
Fig. 3. Cheating strategy for a1 ∈ Af/s to get better always.
Theorem 7. Let a1 ∈ Af/s. There exists a cheating strategy for a1 to get better
always if and only if there exists a post p′ in (E1)G satisfying the following two
properties
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(a) p′ belongs to a non-sink component, say Y1, of G˜M˜ , and
(b) there exists no path T from p′ to M˜(a1) in G˜M˜ such that w(T ) = +1.
Proof. We break down the proof into necessity and sufficiency.
Necessity: Assume that there exists a post p′ satisfying both the properties of
Theorem 7 exists and let H be the instance obtained when a1 submits Lf = p, p′
as output by Step 4 of Figure 3. We show that every popular matching in H
matches a1 to p. It is easy to see thatM = M˜\{(b, M˜(b))} is popular inH . Recall
that, by choice, M is in fact a popular matching in G such that M(a) = p and
p ∈ fG(a1). Since M is a maximum matching on rank-1 edges of G, it continues
to be a maximum matching on rank-1 edges ofH . Further, for every a ∈ A\{a1},
we have M(a) ∈ {fG(a) ∪ sG(a)} which implies that M(a) ∈ {fH(a) ∪ sH(a)}.
Thus M is a popular matching in H .
We now show that every popular matching of H matches a1 to p. Assume
not. Then let M ′ be a popular matching in H such that M ′(a1) = p
′. By the
choice of p′, the post p′ belongs to a non-sink component say Y1 of G˜M˜ and
p′ does not have a path to M˜(a1) = p. Now let us define tight-pair Pp′ and
Ap′ as in Lemma 3. Thus, we have |Pp′ | = |Ap′ | and every a ∈ Ap′ satisfies
choicesG˜(a) ⊆ Pp′ . Since p′ does not have a path to M˜(a1) in G˜M˜ , it is clear
that M˜(a1) /∈ P ′p. Therefore a1 /∈ Ap′ . Further, M˜(b) /∈ P ′p since M˜(b) = ℓ(b)
does not have any incoming edges. Thus, for every a ∈ Ap′ , we conclude that
choicesH(a) ⊆ Pp′ . Now if M ′(a1) = p′ then there exists at least one agent
a ∈ Ap′ which does not have a post to be matched in choicesH(a). Thus, M ′
cannot be a popular matching in H .
Sufficiency: To prove the other direction, assume that no post satisfying the
two properties of Theorem 7 exists. And for contradiction assume that there
exists an instance H where every popular matching in H matches a1 to a post
in fG(a1). Let q
′ ∈ sH(a1). First note that q′ /∈ fG(a1) because otherwise q′ ∈
(O1)G and then q′ /∈ (E1)H ∩ P . Since our algorithm did not find q′, it must be
the case that q′ either belongs to a sink component of G˜M˜ or if q
′ belongs to a
non-sink component of G˜M˜ , then q
′ has a positive weight path to M˜(a1). In each
case we construct a popular matchingM ′ in H such thatM ′(a1) = q
′. This gives
us the desired contradiction. Now note that since M˜(a1) ∈ fG(a1) and fG(a1) ⊆
(O1)G, there is at least one agent, say a2, such that M˜(a2) =M(a2) ∈ sG(a2).
– q′ belongs to a sink component Xi of G˜M˜ : Since q′ belongs to a sink com-
ponent Xi there exists a path T starting at q′ which ends in a sink in
Xi. Now assume that M˜(a1) /∈ Xi or if M˜(a1) ∈ Xi then, q′ does not
have a path to M˜(a1). In this case, consider the matching M1 = M˜ · T
in which the post q′ is unmatched. Let M2 = M1 \ {(a1, M˜(a1))}. Finally
M ′ = {(a1, q′), (a2, M˜(a1))} ∪M2.
We first note that w(T ) = 0. This is because q′ ∈ sH(a1) implies q′ ∈
(E1)H ∩ P = (E1)G˜ ∩ P and the end point of the path T is a sink vertex in
G˜M˜ which again belongs to (E1)G˜ ∩ P . Thus from Table 1, it is clear that
w(T ) = 0. Let AT = ∪p∈T {M˜(p)} denote the set of agents matched to posts
in T . Since q′ did not have a directed path to M˜(a1), the agent a1 /∈ AT .
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Further, b /∈ AT since M˜(b) = ℓ(b) does not have an incoming edge. Thus
for every agent a ∈ AT , we have M ′(a) ∈ {fG˜(a) ∪ sG˜(a)} which implies
that M ′(a) ∈ {fH(a) ∪ sH(a)}. Further, M ′(a2) ∈ fG˜(a2) = fH(a2) and
M ′(a1) ∈ sH(a1). Therefore, for every a ∈ A, M ′(a) ∈ {fH(a) ∪ sH(a)}.
Finally, since w(T ) = 0 and a1 and a2 compensate for the rank-1 edges
amongst themselves, it is clear that the number of rank-1 edges in M ′ is the
same as number of rank-1 edges in M˜ . Thus, M ′ is a maximum matching on
rank-1 edges of H . Thus M ′ is a popular matching in H such that M ′(a1) =
q′ which gives us the desired contradiction.
The case when q′ has a path to M˜(a1) is handled below.
– q′ belongs to a non-sink component Yj of G˜M : Since q′ belongs to a non-sink
component Yj , it implies that q′ has a directed path T to M˜(a1) such that
w(T ) = +1. Otherwise our strategy in Figure 3 would have found q′. The
case when q′ belongs to a sink component, let T denote the path from q′ to
M˜(a1). Since q
′ ∈ (E1)G˜ and M˜(a1) ∈ (O1)G˜, using Table 1, it is clear that
w(T ) = +1.
We obtain M ′ as follows: let M1 = M˜ \ {(a1, M˜(a1)), (b, M˜(b))}. This leaves
the post M˜(a1) unmatched in M1. Let M2 = M1 · T and finally let M ′ =
M2 ∪ (a1, q′). Using the same arguments as above it is possible to show that
for every a ∈ A, M ′(a) ∈ {fH(a) ∪ sH(a)}. We note that since w(T ) = +1
and a1 no longer remains matched to one of her rank-1 posts, the number of
rank-1 edges in M ′ and M˜ is the same. Thus, M ′ is a maximum matching
on rank-1 edges in H . Therefore, M ′ is popular in H and M ′(a1) ∈ sH(a1)
which gives us the required contradiction.
Using Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 we conclude the following.
Theorem 8. The optimal falsified preference list for a single manipulative agent
to get better always can be computed in O(
√
nm) time if preference lists contain
ties and in time O(m+ n) time if preference lists are all strict.
Proof. The main steps of our strategy are (i) to compute the set of popular pairs,
(ii) to construct the switching graph, (iii) run the algorithm given by Figure 2 or
Figure 3 as appropriate for the single manipulative agent. We note that we use
the modified graph G˜ for computing our strategies and let n˜ and m˜ denote the
vertices and edges in G˜ respectively. Clearly, n˜ = n+1 and m˜ < m+n = O(m).
Once the switching graph is constructed, we observe that the algorithms in
Figure 2 and Figure 3 have checks which can be done in time which is linear in
the size of the switching graph. Thus the steps (i) and (ii) defined above decide
the complexity of our cheating strategy. In case of ties, we have shown that
both the steps can be computed in O(
√
nm) time. In case of strict lists, using
the switching graph given by McDermid and Irving [13], both the steps can be
computed in O(m+ n) time. Thus we have the desired result.
Remark: In each case we constructed a falsified preference list for a1 which
was strict and of length exactly two. However, by appending the rest of the
posts in P at the end of a1’s preference list, there is no change in the popular
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matchings that the instance H admits. Thus, we conclude that, if an agent can
manipulate to get better always she can achieve the same when preference lists
are required to be complete.
6 A characterization of equilibrium
Here we consider the set of agents, their preference lists and the popular match-
ings algorithm as a complete information game. That is, knowing the true pref-
erence lists of all the agents and that the central authority chooses an arbitrary
popular matching, every agent chooses a preference list for herself. This prefer-
ence list is then submitted to the central authority. The goal of every agent is
to get better always. An equilibrium of the game is a set of preference lists, one
for each agent, such that no single agent can improve her situation by deviating
from her equilibrium preference list [14].
We now show a necessary and sufficient condition for the true preference lists
of the agents to be an equilibrium of the above game. Let G = (A∪P , E) denote
the instance where ranks on the edges represent true preferences of the agents
and let M be a popular matching in G. Let A = Af ∪ As ∪ Af/s denote the
partition of agents with respect to the popular pairs in G. Let G˜ = (A˜ ∪ P , E˜)
denote the graph as defined in Section 4.3 and let M˜ denote the corresponding
popular matching which matches b to ℓ(b). Note that the agent b is dummy and
is not a part of the game. Let G˜M˜ denote the corresponding switching graph. Let
A˜ = A˜f ∪ A˜s ∪ A˜f/s denote the partition of agents with respect to the popular
pairs in G˜. We first state the following two lemmas.
Lemma 13. If every connected component of G˜M˜ is a sink component, then the
set of true preference lists of agents a ∈ A is an equilibrium of the game defined
by G.
Proof. We claim that since every connected component is a sink component,
every a ∈ A˜ is such that a ∈ A˜f ∪ A˜f/s. Assume for contradiction that, there
exists an agent a ∈ A˜s. Then by Lemma 7, we know that M˜(a) belongs to a non-
sink component of G˜M˜ . However, there are no non-sink components, therefore
a /∈ A˜s and hence A˜s = φ. We claim that this also implies that As = φ. Thus
every A = Af ∪ Af/s. If a ∈ Af , she does not deviate from her true preference
list assuming that the rest of the agents are truthful. On the other hand, if
a ∈ Af/s, from Theorem 7, a can get better always if and only if there exists
a post belonging to a non-sink component of GM with additional properties.
However, there is no non-sink component. Thus, the set of true preference lists
is an equilibrium.
It remains to show that if A˜s = φ then As = φ. Assume not. Then there
exists an a′ ∈ A such that a′ ∈ As. However, a′ ∈ A˜f ∪ A˜f/s. Therefore, there
exists a popular matching M ′ in G˜ such that M ′(a′) ∈ fG˜(a′) = fG(a′). Now
M ′ has to match b to one of her rank-1 posts, otherwise if M ′(b) = ℓ(b), then
M1 = M
′\{(b, ℓ(b))} is a popular matching in G, a contradiction to the fact that
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a′ ∈ As. Now, recall by the definition of the dummy agent b, the set of rank-1
posts for b were the unreachable posts in the graph G1. Therefore, there must
exists one agent say a′′ ∈ A such that M ′(a′′) ∈ sG˜(a′′) = sG(a′′). Consider
the matching M1 = M
′ \ {(b,M ′(b))} which leaves M ′(b) unmatched. Finally,
consider M2 =M1 ∪ (a′′,M ′(b)). It is easy to see that M2 is a popular matching
in G such that M2(a
′) ∈ fG(a′), a contradiction to the fact that a′ ∈ As.
Lemma 14. If there exists at least two non-sink components in G˜M˜ , then the
set of true preference lists of agents a ∈ A is not an equilibrium of the game
defined by G.
Proof. Let Y1 and Y2 be two non-sink components in G˜M˜ . We first claim that
any non-sink component there exists an a ∈ A such that a ∈ Af/s. So let a1 ∈ Y1
be such that a1 ∈ Af/s. Further, we claim that any non-sink component contains
a post p ∈ P such that p ∈ (E1)G. Let p2 ∈ Y2 such that p2 ∈ (E1)G. Assuming
these two claims, it is easy to see that the set of true preference lists is not an
equilibrium because a1 can falsify her preference list by choosing p2 as her rank-2
post and ensuring that every popular matching in the falsified instance matches
a1 to one of her true rank-1 posts.
It remains to show that the the two claims hold. First let us prove that,
given a non-sink component in G˜M˜ , there exists a p ∈ P such that p ∈ (E1)G.
Consider a non-sink component Y containing a post in p ∈ P such that p ∈
(O1 ∪ U1)G˜. Since p belongs to a non-sink component, therefore, p ∈ (U2)G˜ and
therefore M˜(p) = a ∈ (U2)G˜. Therefore the edge (a, q) where q ∈ sG˜(a) does
not get deleted and hence q ∈ Y. However, note that since q ∈ sG˜(a), therefore
q ∈ (E1)G˜ ∩ P = (E1)G ∩ P . Thus, the claim holds.
To show that in a non-sink component Y of G˜M˜ , there exists an agent a ∈
Af/s, we show that there exists at least one E1O1 edge in Y which belongs to a
cycle. This claim can be verified using the Table 1.
Finally, we are left with the case when G˜M˜ contains exactly one non-sink com-
ponent and zero or more sink components. In this case if there exists an agent
a ∈ Af/s such that M˜(a) belongs to a sink component of G˜M˜ , we conclude that
the set of true preferences is not an equilibrium. This is because a can falsify
her preference list by choosing her s(a) contained in the non-sink component.
In the remaining case, assume that there is no agent a ∈ Af/s such that M˜(a)
belongs to a sink component of G˜M˜ . Then for every a ∈ As such that M˜(a)
belongs to the non-sink component in G˜M˜ , we can verify using our strategy for
a single manipulative agent whether true preference list is optimal for a. This
can be done in time proportional to the size of the preference list of a. Thus,
given the switching graph, it is clear that in linear time we can verify whether
the set of true preference lists is an equilibrium strategy for the above defined
game. We therefore conclude the following:
Theorem 9. There exists an O(
√
nm) time algorithm to decide whether true
preference lists of the agents are an equilibrium of the game defined above when
preference lists contain ties and an O(m+ n) time algorithm for the same when
preference lists are all strict.
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Conclusion
In this paper we presented cheating strategies for a single manipulative agent
to get better always. We also studied the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game
with all agents. It would be interesting to study how two or more agents co-
operate and falsify their preference lists in order to get better always. We leave
this as an open problem. Another contribution of the paper is the switching
graph characterization of the popular matchings problem with ties. McDermid
and Irving [13] have used their characterization in case of strict lists to give
efficient algorithms for the optimal popular matchings problem [13] [10]. It
would be useful to exploit the characterization developed here and design efficient
algorithms for the optimal popular matchings problem with ties allowed. We
leave that as another open question.
Acknowledgment: The author is grateful to Prof. Vijaya Ramachandran for
useful discussions on the problem and also to an anonymous reviewer for the
useful comments which improved the presentation considerably.
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